AI boom could entrench autocratic control, researcher warns

An interview with José Kaire, a political science professor at Arizona State University, explores how artificial intelligence may become a tool for autocratic consolidation rather than democratic opening. Kaire's recent book examines a historical puzzle: roughly half of all autocracies that embraced economic liberalization—the policy favored by international financial institutions and the Washington Consensus—went on to experience increased repression and human rights abuses. The conventional theory, championed by economists Milton Friedman and Friedrich Hayek, predicted the opposite: that removing state economic power would weaken authoritarians by making citizens independent enough to oppose them. Yet countries like Mexico, Malaysia, and Senegal saw human rights abuses rise after liberalizing. Kaire's explanation focuses on elite politics within the regime. When dictators liberalize, they threaten the influence of regime insiders—party officials, military officers, and other established power brokers—who fear being displaced by an emerging business class or opposition forces. To keep these elites satisfied and prevent a coup, leaders deploy repression against opposition groups, signaling their commitment to protecting insider interests. Repression thus serves a dual purpose: it silences dissent while managing elite politics, allowing leaders to comply with international demands for economic reform while reassuring their core supporters. Kaire tested this theory across many cases and found the pattern of liberalization followed by repression was not uncommon—statistically, most dictatorships that liberalized displayed it. Venezuela and Cuba offer contemporary test cases. In Cuba, former leader Raúl Castro extended the party's institutional role in the late 2010s, and the military gained autonomy by securing economic privileges insulated from the leader's control; further liberalization could trigger the repression pattern if these elites now have capacity to make demands. Venezuela presents a similar situation, and Kaire speculates that the removal of Nicolás Maduro in a U.S. raid in January 2026 might create opportunity for regime insiders to carve out independence, making future deregulation potentially harmful to human rights. The AI sector now illustrates this dynamic in real time. Under Xi Jinping, China has centralized AI control: the Central Science and Technology Commission overseeing the sector is led by one of Xi's closest allies, and the state actively promotes AI firms aligned with Xi's priorities while disciplining more independent tech entrepreneurs. Kaire finds this politically significant because if these new AI elites become dependent on their relationship with the leader for success rather than on independent markets, they could become an alternative support base for Xi. That would give the leader more flexibility in managing older institutional elites—potentially weakening checks on power rather than strengthening them. Kaire cautions that it remains unclear how far these dynamics will extend, but suspects they may follow the patterns documented in the book: new sources of wealth and influence that are structured to depend on the leader's patronage can paradoxically make autocracies more entrenched, not more democratic.

The article presents research on how authoritarian regimes adapt to structural economic change—a thesis built on a surprising historical pattern. The conventional wisdom, associated with Nobel laureates Milton Friedman and Friedrich Hayek, held that economic liberalization would weaken autocratic rule by making citizens less dependent on the state and therefore more capable of demanding political freedoms. Yet roughly half of all autocracies that opened their economies experienced increased human rights abuses instead. The researcher's answer centers on elite politics: when liberalization threatens the influence of regime insiders—party officials, military officers, and other power brokers—leaders must find ways to keep them satisfied. Repression serves this function by signaling commitment to protecting elite interests while allowing leaders to comply with international pressure for economic reforms. This creates a paradox where policies intended to democratize can actually entrench authoritarianism.

The AI sector now offers a new test case for this dynamic. In China, centralized control over AI—through a commission led by Xi Jinping's closest ally and through state backing of aligned firms—may be creating a new class of elites whose power depends on the leader's patronage rather than independent market success. If those new elites become an alternative base of support, they could reduce the leader's dependence on older institutional power centers, potentially creating space for greater centralization rather than diffusion of power. The researcher remains cautious about predicting the full trajectory, but the structural parallel is clear: emerging sectors of wealth and influence can be weaponized by autocrats to consolidate rather than distribute authority.